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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 17/01/2004 Accident number: 26 
Accident time: not recorded Accident Date: 28/07/1997 
Where it occurred:  Inchope - Gorangoza 
Road km 8+800, 
Sofala Province 
Country: Mozambique 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Other (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 07/08/1997 
ID original source:  Name of source:  
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AT (unrecorded) Ground condition: route (verge), hard 
Date record created: 17/01/2004 Date  last modified: 17/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate metal-detector (?) 
 
Accident report 
A report compiled on behalf of the Country MAC, dated 7th August 1997, was made available. 
The following summarises its content.  
Prior to the demining company's operations at the site, other demining organisations had 
undertaken other projects in the area. During their clearance the demining company found 
one TM-46 (metallic) anti-tank mine and 44 PMNs. Two Pt Mi Ba III (minimum metal) anti-tank 
mines were found by the road-building contractors and were detonated in-situ.  
On the day of the accident a truck initiated a mine with its right front wheel as it turned onto 
the verge to unload. The driver was sitting above the wheel that caused the detonation. He 
escaped from the cab before it caught fire. He was taken to hospital but later discharged in 
"good health". The blast wave threw the truck one-meter forward, destroyed the wheel and 
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made the cab and front tyres catch fire. [Photographs indicate minimal blast damage to the 
cab above the wheel arch – implying deflagration rather than detonation of the device, or an 
incendiary/small blast device.] 
The crater measured 1.5 metres by 0.4 metres and large plastic and rubber fragments were 
found. These were taken to indicate that the mine was probably a TMA2 or a PT56 AT mine. 
Neither mine, to the MAC's knowledge, had been found in Mozambique prior to the accident. 
[The photographs were indistinct and the identification of the device highly suspect: the truck 
burnt out completely but large parts of the mine case were not destroyed in the blast or 
burned in the subsequent fire.] 
 
Conclusion 
The investigation concluded that a plastic anti-tank mine, laid at a depth of 20-25cm was 
missed by the demining group during its clearance. The detectors the group used could not 
detect the kind of mine suspected. 
 
Recommendations 
The investigators recommended that the demining group's detectors should be replaced by 
those with a higher sensitivity. Also that the road-building contractors should cease operations 
due to the unacceptable risk of encountering other such mines. The demining group should 
then recheck the cleared area with better equipment as soon as possible. All demining 
organisations operating in Sofala and neighbouring Provinces should be informed about the 
presence of a TMA2 or PT56 AT mine, and that demining organisations should be required to 
provide the Country MAC with a list of all (types of) mines found. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 40 Name: not recorded 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: driver  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: None Protection used: none 
 
Summary of injuries: 
 
COMMENT 
No formal record of the victim's injuries was made. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because 
the demining group either did not clear the verge, or used a method incapable of locating the 
threat. The secondary cause is listed as “Other” because it is uncertain what went on during 
the demining work.. 
The researcher believes that a 7kg or a 5.5kg mine that detonated would have caused far 
more extensive damage to the vehicle (which was mainly damaged by fire). Also, a 
detonation of such a large amount of explosive would not have left large fragments of casing 
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for the investigators to attempt to identify. If large pieces of casing were found, the device did 
not detonate properly. 
It is possible that the entire accident was a "sham", covering for an accidental fire in the 
vehicle and subsequent insurance claim. 
 
Related papers 
A letter dated 28th July 1997 written by a representative of the road builders stated that the 
mine was 5.7m from the centre of the road, and added  that the driver was "seriously injured". 
It also mentioned an accident on 22nd July 1997 when an AT mine was found in the same 
road, and blown up (presumably by the road builders). No other evidence of injury was found. 
A lengthy internal report, dated 3rd August 1997 was made in Portuguese by the demining 
company. Salient points are that the accident occurred when an 18-ton truck hit a mine 5.75m 
from the centre line at 6:30 on 28th July 1997 while it was turning around to dump gravel. The 
explosion set diesel fuel alight, which completely destroyed the cab. The driver suffered only 
minor injuries. On the 2nd June 1997 a smoke grenade had been found and destroyed 210m 
from the site of the accident. On 4th June 1997 an "M969 anti-tank" [sic] mine was found and 
destroyed 2.85km from the site of the accident. 14 live cartridges and many assorted pieces 
of metal were also found in the area using the Ebinger 420 detector. 
The demining company's management made a supposedly "scientific" assessment of the 
accident and concluded that the explosion occurred 0.72m outside the area marked as clear 
(acknowledging that it is normal to clear up to 0.87 beyond the marked area for the purpose of 
putting in marking stakes). The formula C = K x M x n3 was applied to the explosion, from 
which it was deduced that the mine must have contained a main charge of 7kg and have 
been buried to a depth of between 0.25 and 0.3 metres. It is stated that the maximum depth 
at which the mine could have been activated was 0.42m and that the normal depth to find an 
AT mine is 0.2m. [These claims are not substantiated with source references.] 
The reasons for the accident were given as being because the mine was deeper than usual 
and it was outside the cleared area. Also because it was plastic and difficult to detect. In 
subsequent tests the Ebinger 420 was found incapable of detecting this type of mine when it 
was held more that 0.07 metres away. The demining group decided to try to source a detector 
sensitive enough to locate "non-metal" mines. 
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